Unidad documental simple 8 - Copy of a telegram from Lord Chelmsford to Edwin Montagu

Continues A2/8/6. Shortly after arriving in Bombay as editor of the Bombay Chronicle, Horniman established himself as a prominent member of the extremist section. His paper, which became the recognised organ of extremist politics, consistently misrepresented the policy and intentions of Government, made personal attacks on officials, and publicised incidents likely to arouse racial animosity. In October 1917 Horniman became Secretary of the Home Rule League and obtained complete control of the Chronicle, which thereafter became hostile to Government. In February 1918 he was required to give maximum security under section 3 of the Press Act. In April he took part in the agitation over refusal of passports to Tilak and party to England, and embarked on a campaign of virulent and seditious character in connection with the Imperial and Bombay War Conferences. In November he started to campaign against the proposed memorial to Lord Willingdon. In January 1919 his paper published articles on the Rowlatt Bill which developed into the passive resistance and satyagraha movements. Horniman himself signed the satyagraha vow, being undoubtedly fully aware of the disastrous consequences of his actions. In March and April the Chronicle published letters purportedly from British soldiers with the clear purpose of inflaming discontent. On 26 April the security of the paper was forfeited. A copy of the order, citing typically bad passages, was forwarded with the Secretary's letter of 5 May. A leading article of 23 April accused the Government of repressing trouble with 'horrid and detestable powers of torture and terrorisation'. The mischievous effect of isolated passages is difficult to gauge, but the cumulative effect is beyond question. The paper avoided extreme infringement of the law, but the Bombay Government was advised that prosecution could have been initiated for its writing on the Rowlatt Act and the satyagraha movement; public interests however compelled local government to use a more expeditious means of removing this prime mover of attacks on the government. Events in Delhi and the Punjab had a disturbing effect on the Bombay populace, which Horniman strove to attract to his side. The mob that rioted in Bombay on 11 April was aggressive and the extremist leaders were ill-disposed or impotent [to pacify them]; extensive bloodshed was only avoided by military force and the tact and resolution of the police. Tension however remained and the delay attending criminal prosecution is likely to lead to a recrudescence of violence. Apart from this, the Moslem population is very uneasy with regard to the Caliphate and allied questions, and it is clear from Horniman's allusions to these subjects that he intended to exploit them soon. His swift and secret deportation has so far been justified by its results. There have been no subsequent disturbances, and there now appears to be an absence of unity and activity among the extremist leaders.

(Mechanical copy of typed original.)