Showing 4 results

[Draft] MS letter. Refers to Lawrence's criticism of Austin, and puts forward his understanding of the difference between the two as to the genus of which Positive Law is a species as depending on the difference between the conceptions of 'order' and 'uniformity'. Clarifies the meaning of his statement that positive law in any actual state is not completely orderly. With regard to Grotius' attitude to the 'Roman Jus Gentium', Sidgwick fears that he has not made his meaning clear, and tries to put the point to Lawrence in a different way. Discusses the two possible interpretations that Grotius could have had of the above term, and suggests that its misinterpretation could have been the fault of writers subsequent to him. Observes that Lawrence seems to have missed the point of Sidgwick's question regarding Roman lawyers and the regulation of international relations. Refers to passages quoted 'in the Digest '. Claims that in order to convict Grotius of a mistake on this point, one must 'prove that the Roman jurists would not have used the term "jus gentium" as [Lioy] uses it, if they had had occasion to refer to the same matters.' [Incomplete]

Reports that he is lecturing on the doctrine of Sovereignty in England in that term. Acknowledges his agreement with Sidgwick on his criticisms on Austin. Refers to Sidgwick's Elements of Politics, of which he is unsure if there is a second edition. Asks why have people accepted Austin 'as the exponent of the English school on this point', and what he is supposed to have added to Bentham's Fragment on Government. Believes that Austin's departures from Bentham 'are for the worse in both matter and form.' Refers to Hobbes, and concedes that Austin was successful in formulating 'the conception of a pure or abstract science of positive law.' Corrects Sidgwick's reference to "Austin's Theory of Jurisprudence", which he did not, to Pollock's knowledge write, and refers to works actually written by him, i.e., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and a posthumously published work: Lectures on Jurisprudence. Reports that there is 'an excellent account of Maitland from Grand Canary', and asks Sidgwick if he will be at the [Trinity] College commemoration on 9 December. Reminds Sidgwick that they had not yet 'had out' their difference about 'the irreducible minimum of [ ] for profitable discussion of the universe.' Mentions that the previous night 'a small philosophical club [at Oxford] discussed the Ethics of Conformity' and that 'Rashdall was present and defended his position with great ability.'

Gladly accepts Sidgwick's invitation for Wednesday the 13th. Informs him that his dealings with [John?] Austin are 'very delightful' to him, because Sidgwick 'will deprive him of his terror.' Refers to an accompanying extract, which poses questions on the definition of legal rights [included, 108/2]. Discusses a scenario where a father (having means) omits to supply a young child with food to the damage of the child's health, and asks whether the child has a right. Also refers to the Statute of Limitations in relation to creditors and debtors. Concludes by saying that he is 'trying to avoid 'right' as much as possible and to speak always of duty.'

Typewritten extract [108/1]. Begins with a quote from Lord Chief Justice Holt, and asks if the statement is either true or a truism. Three statements are given that involve rights and remedies: the first involves a wealthy father who omits to supply a young child with sufficient food, and as a consequence the child falls ill; the question is asked whether any right has been infringed; the second states that the Statute of Limitations is sometimes said not to take away the creditor's right, but merely bars his remedy; the third quotes the maxim 'There is no right without a remedy', and asks whether it has been applied in English courts.