Holwood, Beckenham. - Declines invitation for next Sunday. Houghton's skilful presentation of his Monograph subjects. Most recent biographies recall [Sir James?] Mackintosh's paradox 'that a good memoir is one that ought never to have been written'.
Trinity College - WW has seen the London Review of Adam Sedgwick ['A Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge', 3rd ed., 1834]: 'I am somewhat puzzled not being able to make out whether the reviewer is a scoundrel who by bringing together peoples passions...or whether he is a real bona fide example of that silliness which belongs to Benthamites and the like, and which can see nothing but moral horrors in all persons of opposite opinions'. WW has 'got a glimpse, which I have long been wishing and struggling for, of the inductive history of ethics. Mackintosh's [James Mackintosh] Dissertation is my main guide'. WW has also been working on a scheme 'of writing a short essay on mathematics as a part of a liberal education, to appear as the preface to a new edition of one of my many mechanical books which is wanted' ['Thoughts on the Study of Mathematics as Part of a Liberal Education', 1835]. WW gives a few speculations on Gothic architecture.
Trinity College - RJ's examination papers appear to WW excellent: 'I see many reasons for thinking that your system of examinations by the lecturers themselves has several advantages over ours. It is also I think in some degree the Oxford system. I am still scheming and speculating for the improvement of our system here'. WW has written to the editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica offering to edit James Mackintosh's 'History of Moral Philosophy in a separate and convenient form for our men, to write a preface, or analysis or some other kind of appendage to recommend it to our students as the best text book on the subject'. He also wants to write a pamphlet about mathematics as part of a liberal education, 'which will all be founded on the principles of the true philosophy without my telling people more of them than is requisite to be told for the purpose. I want you to come and talk about this for I daresay we shall disagree hugely'. WW reflects upon the current political state: 'One cannot but feel that the present state of the country breaks up all those circles of early friendship which at a former period one hoped would apply a great deal of the quiet pleasures of maturer age'.
In hand of Henrietta Maria Milnes? Original letter dated 1 Aug. 1806, from Bombay.
6 North Bridge, Edinburgh - They will be happy to reprint Mackintosh's dissertation [James Mackintosh, Dissertation of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy with preface by WW, 1836]. Could WW add a few notes to give it some new distinguishing feature.
Wimpole Street - Thanks WW for the two pamphlets [James Mackintosh, Dissertation of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy with a preface by WW, 1836; Newton and Flamsteed: Remarks in an Article in Number 109 of the Quarterly Review, 1836]: 'You have conferred a great benefit on the public by rendering Mackintosh's dissertation so generally acceptable; it will really show that there is a want of interest in ethical philosophy, if it now fails of becoming a standard book. Your own preface, being a clear analysis of the leading parts of the dissertation, will undoubtedly contribute to the result'. HH notes that WW has 'modestly expressed yourself to developing Mackintosh's opinions, without introducing quite so much of your own as I should have desired. There are, in my opinion, some difficulties in the way of the theory which both he and you have maintained, not perhaps irreparable, but such as I have not yet seen removed. I mean particularly the old objections to the existence of a moral faculty, as a standard of right and wrong, drawn from the great diversity of emotions connected with actions which we find among mankind. That moral qualities are the object of emotions, may be easily conceded to Mackintosh and his school' - this seems very different to the line taken by Butler [Samuel Butler] and Hutcheson [Francis Hutcheson]. If we are to admit of a moral system as an authoritative auditor of right and wrong, 'it can only, I think, be done on the hypothesis of a distinct primary faculty; and I cannot understand how any process of association, which must be objective in its origin, and consequently dependent on carnal and exterior circumstances, can generate an uniform rule of judgment or sentiment among mankind'.