Item 122 - Letter from James Martineau to Henry Sidgwick

Sends back 'both Proof and M.S.' [of The Methods of Ethics?, not included], which he read with interest. Acknowledges 'the difficulties attaching to the doctrine' criticised by Sidgwick, but does not believe them to be insuperable, 'or so considerable as the difficulties which the doctrine removes.' Admits that his lack of any adequate conception of Sidgwick's point of view, and also from the 'imperfect way' in which he has presented his own doctrine 'in the Whewell paper', he finds it impossible to present his case 'with any effect.' Suggests that the fundamental difference between their opinions is that while Sidgwick regards judgment of the actions of others as the primary moral fact, he [Martineau] finds it in judgment upon his own actions. States that he has never regarded the valuation of "Motives" as a method for determining the actions proper to pursue. Admits that the '"Moral Sentiments"' have their place 'among the scale of possible impulses', but claims that, if present, 'they cannot decide between the claims of the two competing impulses whose presence constitutes the problem, but can only add themselves on, as an intensification, to the [felt] authority of the higher.'