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Accepts his assurance that the Government of India has not attempted to conceal facts, but in the light of Dyer’s evidence it is difficult to convince the public of this. The real difficulty lies in the fact that Chelmsford’s April telegrams, which suggested that the force used was not excessive, were not followed by further information qualifying that impression. Even the district report of 13 September failed to suggest that Dyer gave the crowd no warning; that it might have dispersed without firing; that he fired on it for general moral effect; that it was unarmed, unresisting, and caught in a trap; that he continued firing after the crowd had been broken up; and that he paid no attention to the many wounded. Montagu will try to urge that judgement should not be passed before the Hunter Committee reports, but Chelmsford has put him in a difficult position by not keeping him fully informed. ‘I sometimes think that you refrain from sending me information in your extreme and admirable desire to protect any officer in India from criticism.’ Points out that Chelmsford can ask him not to publish what he does not wish published.

(i) The annexed telegram about Amritsar must be sent to avoid delay.

(ii) General Dyer’s conduct in firing at Amritsar has been criticised because he is reported to have said that the crowd might have dispersed without being fired on, and because the Criminal Procedure Code forbids the use of unnecessary force to disperse a crowd. Dyer’s defenders, including O’Dwyer, allege that his action prevented disorder elsewhere in the Punjab. Asks Chelmsford to advise his own view of accepted practice, in order that Montagu may express an opinion when the report emerges.

(Typed. Used for transmission.)

Has read the report and discussed it informally with colleagues, though it will not be considered in Council till next week. His provisional opinion is that they should endorse the findings of the majority report. It is regrettable that the cleavage of opinion was so radical as to make two reports necessary, but there is much common ground. The main difference relates to the question of whether martial law was necessary, but by accepting the majority findings regarding the number of outrages, the animus of the rioters, etc., the minority have, he thinks, undermined their case. The minority also condemn more vehemently such incidents as the Jallianwala Bagh firing. With regard to this incident they [the Government of India] will probably endorse the majority opinion, though Chelmsford is prepared to go further and say that General Dyer’s action in fact checked a dangerous rising against Government. As regards action to be taken, the main problem is the case of Dyer. Chelmsford accepts the majority view that at Jallianwala Bagh he acted beyond what a reasonable man would think necessary, and without humanity. He should therefore be asked or compelled to retire, and since he is in poor health and not considered fit for promotion he will probably want to do so. It is not incumbent on the Government to prosecute him, but if he is prosecuted privately they must remain neutral. Dyer did himself scant justice in his evidence by excusing or mitigating nothing and exaggerating some points, and if he was wrong to consider himself responsible for the state of the province, he was justified in considering the position in the area under his command. Believing, correctly, that Amritsar was in a state of rebellion, he thought that the gathering [at Jallianwala Bagh] was the beginning of an influx of outsiders which might have resulted in general looting and the killing of Europeans. The Punjab Government should be asked to take disciplinary action against the other officers whose conduct is blamed.

(Typed. Continued in A2/27/4.)

(i) Has just seen A2/27/2. At first sight it would seem better, if the courts are amenable, for Government to prosecute Dyer than to leave him to private prosecution. Defers giving an opinion on whether it should be before a civil or military tribunal, though the latter would probably not protect Dyer from private prosecution.
(ii) Postpones discussing the matter till next week. Suggests advising the Viceroy that he will reply when he returns on Monday. Is not prepared to exonerate Dyer. ‘What about depor-tations?’

((ii) is repeated, more legibly, in the hand of S. K. Brown.)

Refers to A2/18/6. Is glad the order was cancelled, but it is regrettable that no reprimand has been given either for this order or for that of General Dyer, which has apparently been defended by General Hudson. If there is any mention of these orders in the Commons he will draw attention to the extenuating circumstances, but he cannot defend them.

(Typed, with handwritten alterations.)