Showing 15 results

Encloses a copy of 1/19.

The circumstances under which Churchill became Prime Minister were not as Amery represents them in his review of Churchill’s book (The Gathering Storm).

—————

Transcript

11th. October, 1948.
To the Editor of “The Spectator”

Sir,—

The Churchillian Epic

In the interests of Historical accuracy I must express my dissent from the impression conveyed by the conculding† paragraph of Mr. Amery’s review of Mr. Churchill’s book {1}.

No doubt it is true that it was the decision of the three men on May 10, 1940 that made Mr. Churchill Prime Minister. But this decision was based on the political situation in the House of Commons.

It was generally recognised that in the national emergency there must be a Coalition Government. The Labour Party had refused to serve under Mr. Chamberlain. The question of serving under Lord Halifax never arose, but it is inconceivable that they would have agreed, first, because he was in the upper House and secondly, because he had been an active supporter of Mr. Chamberlain’s “appeasement” of Hitler. They were prepared to serve under Mr. Churchill. No other possible choice presented itself.

These facts may not have been positively known at the time by all the three men. But there was the strongest presumptive evidence that they were true.

Yours etc.,
[blank]

The Editor,
The Spectator,
99, Gower Street,
London, W.C.1.

—————

{1} The Second World War, Vol. 1: The Gathering Storm.

† Sic.

179 City Road, E.C.1.—Encloses a draft letter to Amery (3/200), prepared as a result of last Tuesday’s meeting.

112 Eaton Square, S.W.1.—His view of the circumstances under which Churchill became Prime Minister has been corroborated by Brendan Bracken.

—————

Transcript

112 Eaton Square, S.W.1.
12th October, 1948.

My dear Pethick,

I shall be interested to see your letter in The Spectator. Curiously enough I had information directly contrary to your conclusion only three days ago. Brendan Bracken told a friend of mine that on the evening of May 9th 1940 Attlee told him that he would be willing to serve under Halifax but not under Winston. Bracken vigorously argued about this and ended by shaking Attlee considerably. In any case the decision, if it had been subjected to a Parliamentary vote, would certainly have gone to Halifax as the overwhelming majority of the Conservatives would have preferred him, as a safer man. Don’t forget that up to the last Winston was widely distrusted on all sides.

Yours sincerely,
L S Amery

The Rt. Hon. Lord Pethick-Lawrence of Peaslake.

I fear the above is confidential so I cannot use it to reply to your letter!

Outlines the points agreed on by an all-party group in the Commons in connection with constitutional reform in India. Asks him to consider the matter and obtain the opinion of the Viceroy (Linlithgow).

(Carbon copy of a typed original.)

—————

Transcript

Draft letter to Mr. Amery.

27.10.41.

As you know there is widespread feeling among Members of all Parties in the House of Commons that, although the enlargement of the Viceroy’s Council and the setting up of the National Defence Council are to be regarded as most important and satisfactory steps, these do not in themselves afford a solution for the fundamental constitutional problem, and that it is necessary to continue making efforts to this end.

A small group met to discuss this matter in the House of Commons last week. There were present Wardlaw Milne, Edward Cadogan, Pethick Lawrence, Graham White and myself. There was general agreement on the following points.

1. The Indian problem is a matter on which Members of the House of Commons feel that they have a direct responsibility as Members.

2. The step most urgently needed at present is that a small body of Indians of experience, intellectual ability, and constructive ideas, should get together in India to consider what form of constitution can be devised which would be acceptable to the main Parties as a substitute for the 1935 Act.

The meeting fully appreciated the difficulties of the present situation, the essence of which is that, not only the leaders of Congress, but even the Liberal Party, seem to be asking the British Government to undertake a substantial immediate transfer of constitutional power to Indian Ministers without any prior agreement or even discussion as to the ultimate form of the new constitution. The problem is how to get representative statesmen away from this negative position and working together on the constructive planning work which is necessary. After full discussion those present agreed that the following line of action is worthy of consideration.

A representative group of all Parties in the House of Commons (which might very well be the group of Members who sent an Open Letter to India at the end of 1940) should send a communication to the leaders of the various Parties in India, making the following points:

(a) The feeling in the House of Commons is one of grave distress that progress is not being made towards a constitutional settlement, that such a settlement is deeply desired on the British side but that these Members do not see how it can be attained without agreement between the Parties on the form of a new constitution.

(b) It is important on the one hand that Parliament should understand what motives are holding the Indian leaders back from discussion on this matter and, on the other hand, that the leaders themselves should understand what are the feelings in the House of Commons.

(c) It is possible that personal discussion between British M.P.s and Indian leaders might help to a better understanding in both these directions, and, further, that a joint discussion of the constitutional problem itself might be helpful. Although difficulties of travel and the great preoccupation of all those engaged in public life with urgent issues at home are serious obstacles, the feeling in the House of Commons on the matter is so strong that it could probably be arranged that a small representative group, say not more than three or four, representing all Parties in the House of Commons, should pay a visit to India. This visit would be entirely unofficial in the sense that it would be in no way connected with the Government. Its object would be:

1st. to assure the Indian leaders of the great interest of the House of Commons in finding a constructive solution and of the general feeling in the House as to the way in which such a solution could be found;

2nd. to give the M.P.s concerned a chance of appreciating the Indian position and of giving a true account of this to the House;

3rd. To† afford such help as these Members could to the Indian Parties in dealing with the problem itself.

Having explained these points the communication would end with a definite request to be informed by the leaders of each of the main Parties whether, in the event of this small mission visiting India, they would be prepared to enter into discussion with the British M.P.s either alone or jointly with the representatives of the other Indian Parties.

The Members present at the meeting were under no illusions as to the difficulties of finding any sort of accommodation with the extreme Party leaders, and they recognised the probability that both Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah would refuse to enter into joint discussions. They saw also a number of other possible difficulties. On the other hand they felt that action on the lines suggested could not do any harm and might do a considerable amount of good in convincing Indians of British interest in the problem and of Parliament’s desire to find a constructive solution. The general view also was that, even if a solution cannot be found, anything that can be done now to keep the situation fluid and to prevent permanent estrangement growing up would be of value. They have in mind the situation which will arise after the war when, after the period of war prosperity and excietment† is over, political leaders will almost certainly resume their sway over the masses.

Some of the Members present were more hopeful as to the possibilities than others but all were agreed in desiring me to ask you to consider this matter and, if you thought fit, to send a copy of this letter by Air Mail to the Viceroy, asking him to inform you by telegram of his own views on the proposal. Although the essence of the idea is that the visit is a completely spontaneous gesture by the House of Commons and in no sense a move which has been suggested or encouraged by Government, it is of course rully {1} recognised that it would be most undesirable that it should be undertaken if it were actively disapproved of by yourself or the Viceroy.

There will doubtless be considerable difficulties in finding Members of the right qualifications to go, and the provision of money for the expenses of some of the Members will also have to be considered. It was, however, generally felt that these difficulties could be overcome and were certainly worth overcoming if there were even a small hope that some good might be achieved.

An important point is that there should be some sounding of the position and possibly some private approaches to individuals before the proposal is made public. This is a matter for careful consideration.

In the course of the discussion it was suggested that such a visit might perhaps be arranged through the Empire Parliamentary Association and be represented as a gesture made by that Association. While it was recognised that there might be certain advantages in this, the general feeling was that it would tend to blunt the sharpness of the impression which it is desired to convey, viz: an impression of the great interest felt on the subject in the House of Commons and of the earnest desire of the House of Commons, as such, to help in finding a solution.

—————

{1} A slip for 'fully'.

† Sic.

179 City Road, E.C.1.—Encloses an explanatory note (3/203). Has exchanged correspondence on the subject with Amery, which he will be glad to show to Pethick-Lawrence.

India Office.—The Viceroy (Linlithgow) does not think this the time for the kind of good-will mission suggested. Explains why he agrees with this view, and points out other methods which might be used to ease the deadlock.

(Carbon copy of a typed transcript.)

—————

Transcript

COPY

India Office, | Whitehall.
21st. November, 1941.

My dear Schuster,

I have just heard from the Viceroy that he does not think that this is really the time for the kind of good will mission suggested. He does not think it could do any good in the present situation and might even do harm. I am afraid I must agree with his conclusion. I fear that there might be every danger of the leaders of the main parties, short of a Government decision to accord Dominion status now, giving a public rebuff to the visit. As you will remember, your very friendly and helpful open letter last year met with a cool reception and Miss Rathbone’s earnest and sincere appeal only provoked the most violent criticism.

I imagine that both Gandhi and Jinnah might not only ignore the mission, but order their followers to do so.

On top of all this there is the terrific difficulty about securing priority for air passages.

Isn’t the best chance under present conditions of easing the deadlock to give Indians themselves the opportunity of creating credit for any constructive move—assisting them entirely sub-rosa, which might be done to some extent by people like Wint or Hodson or Coupland, and by reading your book {1}, but not by a Parliamentary mission which could not but attract attention, and might very well be suspected of being really a disguised official mission?

I don’t think you should assume that because the major deadlock is unsolved, and likely to be unsolved for some time to come, we are pursuing a purely negative policy. On the contrary, I cannot but hope that in actual working the new Executive and the National Defence Council will begin to exercise a very real influence on the outlook of India, and be increasingly contrasted with the purely negative attitude both of Gandhi and of Jinnah. In all these things one has, after all, to take time into one’s counsels. Incidentally time, in the shape of a German advance in the Caucasus or a Japanese invasion of Burma, may help the process of reflection.

I have telegraphed to Wint saying that we both think he had better go on with his investigations into Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,
(Sgd) L. S. AMERY

—————

{1} George Schuster and Guy Wint, India and Democracy: A Summary (1941).

179 City Road, E.C.1.—Accepts his arguments (see 3/205), but points out that the group had not envisaged an ordinary good-will mission.

179 City Road, E.C.1.—Since the deputation to Amery was ineffective, a deputation should be sent to the Prime Minister (Churchill). Sets out the points to be made, drawing particular attention to the question of the strategic position of India after the war.

Transcript

179 City Road, E.C.1.
6th April, 1943.

Personal and strictly confidential

Dear Pethick-Lawrence

Reflecting on our deputation to Amery and the Indian debate in the House, I feel strongly that we in the House of Commons ought not to be content to leave matters where they are. It seemed to me that our deputation to Amery showed clearly that it is little use for us to talk to him. We really need to get right through to the Prime Minister. I therefore feel that we ought to ask the Prime Minister to receive a deputation about India.

I do not want to bother you with a long letter so I will put as briefly as possible the three points which I think we should make to him.

First: To impress on him the value of showing the Indian public—
that he is personally interesting himself in the Indian problem;
that he is determined to go ahead (in spite of his pre-war attitude); but that British action will be governed by certain clear principles which we consider to be right and that threats of political disturbance will not force us to abandon these.

Second: To impress on him our view as to the vital importance of getting the right man to India as Viceroy and not to allow this matter to drift on further.

Third: To raise with him the whole question of the strategic position of India in the post war world.

Whatever may be the political outcome one has to face the fact that India is not likely to attain great political stability in the early years of the new constitution. On the other hand India occupies a strategic position which represents one of the key points in the security structure of the world. It is a point which cannot be left open or as an invitation to new trouble-makers to step in. Presumably if, as contemplated in last year’s declaration, the British Government is to make a treaty with the new Indian Union, the provision of the necessary measures for the strategic security of the United Nations (naval bases, military garrisons, equipment for production of munitions, etc. etc.) will be one of the terms to be covered by the Treaty. I think we ought to ask whether these matters are receiving consideration (I have the case of the Irish ports very much in my mind) {1} and also particularly whether their significance is appreciated by the United States. United States opinion may criticise us for our handling of the Indian political situation because it is so easy to adopt high standards for other people’s problems; but, when it comes to strategic security, their interests will be identical with ours.

I will not develop this last point further. I am sure you will appreciate its significance. I touched upon it in my own speech in the India debate, but I did not want to say too much. It seems to me to have a vital bearing on the whole Indian Problem.

If you think there is any force in my line of argument perhaps we could have a few words about the matter in the House. I had already last week mentioned to Ammon my idea that some of us ought to try and see the Prime Minister. If you agree with this view it would then be a question of what sort of deputation should go, and this is also a matter on which I should like to have a few words with you.

Yours sincerely,
George Schuster

The Rt. Hon.
F. W. Pethick Lawrence, M.P.

—————

{1} ‘I have … mind’ added in the margin. Brackets supplied.

‘The Spectator’, 99 Gower Street, London, W.C.1.—Pethick-Lawrence’s letter (see 1/19) will appear in the next issue.

Commends Schuster’s draft letter to Amery (see 3/200) and suggests a slight amendment.

Refers to Amery’s account of his stewardship at the India Office at the last meeting of the East India Association, and offers to continue the story.

Barnfield, Bayley’s Hill, Sevenoaks, Kent.—Congratulates him on his appointment (as Secretary of State for India) and his peerage. Is hopeful that he and Wavell will be able to effect a change in ‘the whole scene’.