Refers to Sidgwick's article in the October number of Mind, which referred to their 'short interview' at Oxford. Expresses his regret that his recollection of the conversation is not reflected in the article. Clears up the question of his nationality, by stating firmly that he is 'not a Russian professor of philosophy', but 'a polish [sic] philosopher, accidentally employed as professor of philosophy at one of the universities of Russia.' Goes on to explain the difference between Russians and Poles - the latter, in his opinion, being civilised, and the former 'the most cruel Barbars, who kill their own prophets and are in eternal war with every manifestation of political or religious freedom.'
Quotes from the poem Dziady by the Polish poet Mickiewicz, and claims not to recognise 'any power nor any form of being above the individual.' Declares that he does not conceive an infinite personality, and knows nothing about an almighty, omniscient, perfect being. The being he knows best is, he says, himself - then other human beings. Admits the possibility of the existence of an invisible spirit, who may be named God, who is the cause of certain of his own actions, but does not concede the fact of his being almighty. Discusses his conception of God, whom he is 'inclined to deny' being his creator; thinks that he could not have been created at all, 'because creation implies a beginning in time and time is only the ideal form of phaenomena.' Claims that 'true beings' like himself are independent of time, 'because the existence of time itself is conditioned by their existence.' Illustrates the difference between succession and time. Describes his life as being 'a succession of events...not determinated in advance', and claims that his free will is the chief factor of his acts, and that he is conscious of his faculty of choice at every point of his life. States that the answer to the question "What do you think really exists?" is one which 'divides humanity into two entirely opposite camps, and influences not only philosophical doctrines, but also political, economical, religious beliefs.'
Refers to the different answers that would be given to this question by an individualist, and by a universalist. Claims that of the two, the universalist 'is the most diversified species'; that he appears as idealist in Plato or Hegel, as materialist in Democritus or Epicurus, as pantheist in Spinoza, as a pessimist in Schopenhauer, as a socialist in modern society.' Describes the universalist's views on politics, economics, religion, and psychology. Claims that due to the strength of universalism, individualism 'has frequently lost its best advocates through universalistic suggestion.' Refers to Descartes, who began with individualism, and 'ended in acknowledging concursus Dei in each act of our soul', and to Leibnitz, who 'could not get over the difficulty of interaction without harmonie préétablie.' Claims that the whole history of modern philosophy 'is full of such contradictions between the individual[']s independence and God[']s omnipotence', and notes the contradiction inherent in the belief in immortality, without believing oneself to be an uncreated, independent being. States that he has discussed his existence with different adherents of universalism: materialists, idealists, pantheists, pessimists, and has come to the conclusion that 'they might be right for themselves' and wrong as to his own existence and the existence of other individualists. Is content to let them be 'what they pretend to be', and hopes one day 'to make at last the personal acquaintance of that mysterious being, their master.' Defies their master, however, to become his master; announces that he will 'resist his power like Shelley[']s Prometheus "with a calm fixed mind"'. Claims to love mankind, truth, beauty, not because it is God[']s will, but because it is his own will, and asserts that he acts according to his ideas of duty, not imposed by any other being, but by his own consideration of the results of his action. Refers to 'a set of men', for example Nietzsche, whom he calls 'incarnated devils', and who are independent beings like himself, but 'their will has other aims.' States that he has no explanation for the mystery of interaction 'between the beings', as '[i]t is useless to explain a common experience by a very uncommon and remote hypothesis.' In relation to the 'supposed action of God on men', claims that if Descartes or Leibnitz understood how God could create or act', they could understand existence. Asserts that while they were 'parts, manifestations or servants of their God', he is his own lord, and that he can resist the action of their God if he so wishes.
Refers to Sidgwick having boasted of his 'cunning ways of "gaining time"', and asks him what has he gained after all. Claims that Sidgwick has left him in uncertainty whether he really exits, or whether he is 'only a manifestation of something else'. Assures him that he has read his books, a fact doubted by Sidgwick in his article, and refers to his admiration for the Methods of Ethics. Also refers to his Report on the census of hallucinations. Claims, however, not to seek in books answers to such questions as he has posed in his letter, From books, he claims, one might 'nearly always gather contradictory conclusions'. As a dialectician, he prefers to deal with living beings, who are able to answer his questions. Again asks Sidgwick what he thinks really exists, and why he cares so much to gain time. Apologises for the intrusion on Sidgwick's time. Expresses the hope to see him again 'some happy day', when he shall be allowed to return to England. States that he will then questions Sidgwick on his knowledge about true existence. Sends his compliments to Mrs Sidgwick. Asks Sidgwick if he has a copy of his article on immortality, 'published by W. T. Harris in the Journal of speculative philosophy at Washington'. Asks him to let him know if the letter reaches him, because, he claims, most of their letters 'are now opened by the police with the hope to find some information about [their] secret political associations.'
