Pièce 14 - William Whewell to Richard Jones

4 pp.

Trinity College - WW is surprised at RJ's 'indignation' of the word metaphysics: 'It is no doubt true that people apply it to the speculations of others when they want them to appear abstruse and unsubstantial and to their own when they would have them seem profound and philosophical'. If they did not use this word they would find another. If 'you will not allow metaphysical to have its application to the philosophy of mind you will find no precise use for it. In general it seems to mean either that which depends upon the examination of our intellectual powers and properties, or that kind of reasoning, depending upon the legerdemain of abstract forms, which the origin of the term would attach to it'. By 'the metaphysics of mathematics I mean the examination of the laws and powers of the mind on which their evidence depends, the analysis of their principles into the most simple form and if you choose the history of their development. It is not easy to stick to the distinction between this and the logic of the science - but the latter examines the accuracy of your mode of deducing conclusions from your principles and the former your way of getting your principles. The metaphysics of language is equally intelligible for the mutual influence of mental operations and signs is to be called metaphysical and the word is to be called metaphysical if the word is to have any reputable signification'. WW agrees that there cannot be a metaphysics of political economy 'for there are no peculiar principles of observation or deduction employed in that science - they may as well talk of the metaphysics of chemistry. The thing which I suppose leads them into error is that some abstract terms are necessarily introduced in your science, and some even referring to the moral and intellectual qualities of man...But never mind if other people call you so - being well assured that you and Malthus belong not to the metaphysical but to the ethical school of Political Economy'.